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Abstract
Necessity (resp. possibility) measures are very simple min-decomposable (resp. max-decomposable) representations of epistemic 
uncertainty due to incomplete knowledge. They can be used in both quantitative and qualitative settings. In the present work, 
we revisit Choquet and Sugeno integrals as criteria for decision under uncertainty and propose new axioms when uncertainty is 
representable in possibility theory. First, a characterization of Choquet integral with respect to a possibility or a necessity measure 
is proposed. We respectively add an optimism or a pessimism axiom to the axioms of the Choquet integral with respect to a general 
capacity. This new axiom enforces the maxitivity or the minitivity of the capacity without requiring the same property for the 
functional. It essentially assumes that the decision-maker preferences only reflect the plausibility ordering between states of nature. 
The obtained pessimistic (resp. optimistic) criterion is an average maximin (resp. maximax) criterion of Wald across cuts of a 
possibility distribution on the state space. The additional axiom can be also used in the axiomatic approach to Sugeno integral 
and generalized forms thereof to justify possibility and necessity measures. The axiomatization of these criteria for decision under 
uncertainty in the setting of preference relations among acts is also discussed. We show that the new axiom justifying possibilistic 
Choquet integrals can be expressed in this setting. In the case of Sugeno integral, we correct a characterization proof for an existing 
set of axioms on acts, and study an alternative set of axioms based on the idea of non-compensation.
Keywords: Choquet integral; Sugeno integral; Possibility theory
1. Introduction
In multiple-criteria decision making, discrete fuzzy integrals are commonly used as aggregation functions. They 
calculate a global evaluation for objects or alternatives evaluated according to some criteria, taking into account 
dependencies between them. When the evaluation scale is quantitative, Choquet integrals are often used, while in the 
case of a qualitative scale Sugeno integrals are more naturally considered [26]. The definition of the discrete fuzzy 
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integrals is based on a monotonic set function named capacity after Choquet (see [35,44] and a complete bibliography 
in [25]), or fuzzy measure after Sugeno [43], that attaches importance or uncertainty weights to groups of criteria or 
states. Capacities are used in many areas such as uncertainty modeling [7], multicriteria aggregation [11,27,26] or in 
game theory [40,25]. The similarity between Sugeno and Choquet integrals was noticed quite early [5,4].
The characterization of Choquet integral on quantitative scales is based on a general capacity [41,4,31], which 
covers the case of a lower or an upper probability defined from a family of probability functions. There are no results 
concerning the characterisation of the Choquet integral with respect to a possibility or a necessity measure. In contrast, 
for the qualitative setting, characterizations of Sugeno integrals with respect to possibility measures exist [23,6]. This 
does not come as a surprise since Sugeno integrals with respect to necessity (resp. possibility) measures are still 
minitive (resp. maxitive) functionals, while this is not the case for the corresponding Choquet integrals.
This paper proposes a new property called levelwise-pessimism (resp. levelwise-optimism) to be added to axioms 
characterizing Choquet integrals that may justify the use of a necessity (resp. possibility) measure for representing 
uncertainty or weights of groups of criteria. This additional axiom enforces the minitivity (resp. the maxitivity) of 
the capacity without forcing the functional to have these properties. It essentially assumes that the decision-maker 
preferences only reflect the plausibility ordering between criteria or states of nature. Such specific Choquet integrals, 
which generalize maximin and maximax criteria of Wald, are currently used in signal processing based on maxitive 
kernels [24] or in sequential decision [1].
We also show that the same levelwise-pessimism and levelwise-optimism properties can be added to character-
isations of Sugeno integrals, to obtain possibilistic qualitative integrals (weighted min and max). Finally we show 
that these properties can be expressed in the Savage setting of preference between acts, and discuss the possibility 
of act-based characterization of possibilistic Choquet integrals. In this paper, we also contribute to the decision-
theoretic foundations of Sugeno integrals by revisiting and improving existing proofs, and proposing an alternative 
non-compensation axiom.
This program contrasts with the work of Rebillé [37], which is a qualitative counterpart to Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern approach to expected utility, where loteries involving frequentist probabilities are replaced by possibility 
distributions, and Choquet integrals with respect to necessity measures are obtained. Here, we do not assume that 
uncertainty is represented by possibility theory, but the latter is derived from the axioms.
The paper is organized in two parts. The next section is devoted to Choquet integral. We recall possibilistic Choquet 
integrals and introduce the new properties (one expressing optimism, one expressing pessimism) that, added to exist-
ing characteristic properties, justify possibility theory as the underlying uncertainty representation. Then we point out 
that adapting the framework to the setting of Savage acts and decision under uncertainty is somewhat problematic due 
to the difficulty of retrieving infinitary versions of maxitivity and minitivity. The rest of the paper applies the same pro-
gram to Sugeno integral in the finite, totally ordered setting. In Section 3, it is first shown that characteristic properties 
of Sugeno integrals can be augmented with the same levelwise-pessimism and levelwise-optimism properties as in the 
case of Choquet integral so as to characterize the weighted min or max for multi-criteria decision making (MCDM). 
Then we reconsider the preference-based axiomatisations of Sugeno integrals, pointing out a gap in existing proofs, 
and proposing an alternative proof, as well as one approach based on a non-compensation axiom, and finally an al-
ternative axiomatisation of qualitative possibilistic criteria based on the levelwise-pessimism and levelwise-optimism 
axioms.
2. Characterization of possibilistic Choquet integrals
We adopt the notations used in MCDM, where some objects or alternatives are evaluated according to a common 
finite set C = {1, · · · , n} of criteria. In the case of decision under uncertainty (DMU), C is the set of the possible states 
of the world. A common, totally ordered, evaluation scale V is assumed to provide ratings according to the criteria. 
Each object is identified with a function f = (f1, · · · , fn) ∈ V n, called a profile, where fi is the evaluation of f
according to criterion i. The set of all these objects (or acts in the setting of DMU) is denoted by V .
A capacity or fuzzy measure is a non-decreasing set function µ : 2C → L, where L is a totally ordered scale with 
top 1 and bottom 0 such that µ(∅) = 0 and µ(C) = 1, with L ⊆ V . The two scales are commensurate. The reason for 
choosing two scales L and V instead of a single one, is first that V is a utility scale while L is an uncertainty scale. 
In the numerical setting, one may take L = [0, 1] while V = [0, ∞). In the qualitative setting, L and V are finite, and 
we assume they have the same top and bottom, but one may have that the image µ(2C) of µ be a proper subset of V . 
When L is equipped with a negation denoted by 1 −·, the conjugate of a capacity µ is defined by µc(A) = 1 −µ(A), 
where A is the complement of A.
A possibility measure 5 is a capacity obeying the maxitivity property: 5(A ∪ B) = max(5(A), 5(B)) [45]. If 
π = (π1, . . . , πn) is the possibility distribution associated with 5 (i.e., πi = 5({i})), we have 5(A) = maxi∈A πi ,
which makes it clear that πi = 1 for some i. In multi-criteria decision making, πi is the importance of the criterion i.
In the case of decision under uncertainty, πi represents the plausibility of the state i. A necessity measure is a capacity
N obeying the minitivity property N(A ∩ B) = min(N(A), N(B)) [14]; then we have N(A) = mini /∈A 1 − πi since
functions 5 and N are conjugate capacities. See [14] for an introduction to possibility theory, and [16] for a recent 
bibliography.
2.1. Discrete possibilistic Choquet integrals
In this part, L is supposed to be the unit interval. The Möbius transform associated with a numerical capacity µ is 
the set function mµ attaching to each set T ⊆ C a value
mµ(T )=
∑
K⊆T
(−1)|T \K|µ(K),
where 
∑
T⊆Cmµ(T ) = 1 (see for instance [25]). The sets T such that mµ(T ) 6= 0 are called the focal sets of µ. Note
that subsets other than singletons may have negative Möbius values. Using mµ, the discrete Choquet integral of a
function f : C→R with respect to a capacity µ can be simply expressed as a generalized weighted mean [9]:
Cµ(f )=
∑
T⊆C
mµ(T )min
i∈T
fi . (1)
Suppose µ is a necessity measure N and let σ be the permutation of the criteria such that 1 = πσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ πσ(n) ≥
πσ(n+1) = 0. The Choquet integral of f with respect to N boils down to:
CN (f )=
n∑
i=1
(πσ(i) − πσ(i+1)) min
j :πj≥πσ(i)
fj =
n∑
i=1
(πσ(i) − πσ(i+1))
i
min
j=1
fσ(j) (2)
since the focal sets of N are among the sets {σ(1), · · · , σ(i)}i=1,··· ,n and their value for the Möbius transform is
πσ(i) − πσ(i+1) respectively. Using the identity C5(f ) = 1 −CN (1 − f ) one obtains the Choquet integral of f with
respect to the conjugate possibility measure in the form:
C5(f )=
n∑
i=1
(πσ(i) − πσ(i+1)) max
j :πj≥πσ(i)
fj =
n∑
i=1
(πσ(i) − πσ(i+1))
i
max
j=1
fσ(j) (3)
Note that if π1 = · · ·πn = 1 then CN (f ) = minni=1 fi and C5(f ) = max
n
i=1 fi are Wald maximin and maximax
criteria, respectively. Moreover if many criteria have the same importance πi , then the expression of CN (resp. C5)
proves that we take into account the worst (resp. best) value of fj according to these criteria.
It is well known and worth noticing that the functional CN is not minitive and C5 is not maxitive [8] as shown by
the following example.
Example 1. We consider C = {1, 2}, the possibility distribution π and the following profiles f and g as in the table 
below:
{1} {2}
π 1 0.5
f 0.2 0.3
g 0.4 0.1
{1} {2}
min(f, g) 0.2 0.1
max(f, g) 0.4 0.3
Then, CN (f ) = 0.5 · 0.2 + 0.5 · 0.2 = 0.2 and CN (g) = 0.5 · 0.4 + 0.5 · 0.1 = 0.25, but CN (min(f, g)) = 0.5 · 0.2 +
0.5 · 0.1 = 0.15 6=min(CN (f ), CN (g)) and CN (max(f, g)) = 0.5 · 0.4 + 0.5 · 0.3 = 0.35 6=max(CN (f ), CN (g)).
2.2. Pessimistic and optimistic substitute profiles
Using the permutation σ on the criteria associated with π , a pessimistic profile f σ,− and an optimistic profile f σ,+
can be associated with each profile f [15]: ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
f
σ,−
i = min
j :πj≥πσ(i)
fj =
i
min
j=1
fσ(j); f
σ,+
i = max
j :πj≥πσ(i)
fj =
i
max
j=1
fσ(j). (4)
Clearly, f σ,− and f σ,+ are respectively obtained by taking the worst and the best evaluation at each level of π . 
Observe that only the ordering of elements i induced by π on C is useful in the definition of the pessimistic and 
optimistic profiles associated with f . These profiles correspond to the values of f appearing in the weighted mean 
expressions (2) and (3). Substituting pessimistic and optimistic profiles associated with f in these expressions, possi-
bilistic Choquet integrals take the form of usual discrete expectations Ep w.r.t. a probability distribution p on C, with
pσ(i) =mσ(i) = πσ(i) − πσ(i+1):
CN (f )=
n∑
i=1
mσ(i)f
σ,−
i =Ep(f
σ,−)= CN (f
σ,−);
C5(f )=
n∑
i=1
mσ(i)f
σ,+
i =Ep(f
σ,+)= C5(f
σ,+).
Two profiles f and g are said to be comonotonic if and only if for all i, j ∈ C, fi > fj implies gi ≥ gj . So f and g
are comonotonic if and only if there exists a permutation τ on C such that fτ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ fτ(n) and gτ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ gτ(n).
For any profile f , we have f σ,−1 ≥ · · · ≥ f
σ,−
n and f σ,+1 ≤ · · · ≤ f
σ,+
n . So for any pair of profiles f and g, f σ,− and
gσ,− (resp. f σ,+ and gσ,+) are comonotonic.
There are several profiles that are evaluated the same as a given one by a possibilistic Choquet integral. Especially 
we can define a sequence of progressively changing profiles (φk)1≤k≤n, ranging from f to f σ,−, that are equivalently
evaluated by CN . Namely, φ1 = f , φk+1 ≤ φk , φn = f σ,− where φk+1 = φk except for one coordinate. The profiles
φk are defined by
φk(i)=
{
minl:πl≥πσ(i) fl if i ≤ k
fi otherwise.
Similarly we can define a sequence of profiles, ranging from f to f σ,+, that are equivalently evaluated by C5. Namely,
(φk)1≤k≤n such that φ1 = f , φk+1 ≥ φk , φn = f σ,+ where φk+1 = φk except for one coordinate. The profiles φk are
defined by
φk(i)=
{
maxl:πl≥πσ(i) fl if i ≤ k
fi otherwise.
We observe that CN (f ) = CN (φk), C5(f ) = C5(φk), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n .
Example 2. We consider C = {1, 2, 3}, the permutation associated with 5 such that π1 ≥ π2 ≥ π3 and the profile
f = (2, 1, 3). We have φ2 = (2, 1, 3) and φ3 = f σ,− = (2, 1, 1); and φ2 = (2, 2, 3) and φ3 = f σ,+ = (2, 2, 3). We can
check that CN (f ) = CN (φ2) = CN (φ3) = 2(1 − π2) + π2, while C5(f ) = C5(φ2) = C5(φ3) = 2(1 − π3) + 3π3.
2.3. Representation theorem
Consider the case of Boolean functions, corresponding to subsets A, B of C. Their profiles are just characteristic 
functions 1A, 1B . Given a permutation σ induced by π , let us find their corresponding optimistic and pessimistic
Boolean profiles.
Lemma 1. For all A ⊆ C non-empty, 1σ,−A = 1B for a subset B = Aσ,− ⊆ A and 1σ,+A = 1B for a superset B =
Aσ,+ ⊇A.
Proof. 1σ,−A (i)=min
i
k=1 1A(σ (k)) = 1 if ∀k ≤ i, σ(k) ∈A, and 0 otherwise. So 1
σ,−
A = 1B ≤ 1A, hence B ⊆A.
1σ,+A (i)=max
i
k=1 1A(σ (k)) = 1 if ∃k ≤ i, σ(k) ∈A, and 0 otherwise. So 1
σ,+
A = 1B ≥ 1A, hence A ⊆ B . ✷
It is easy to realize that the set Aσ,− exactly contains the largest sequence of consecutive criteria (σ(1), . . . , σ(k−)) 
in A, while the set Aσ,+ exactly contains the smallest sequence of consecutive criteria (σ(k+), . . . , σ(n)) that in-
cludes A.
Lemma 2. A capacity µ is a necessity measure if and only if there exists a permutation σ on C such that for all A we 
have µ(A) = µ(Aσ,−).
A capacity µ is a possibility measure if and only if there exists a permutation σ on C such that for all A we have 
µ(A) = µ(Aσ,+).
Proof. Let σ be such that µ(A) = µ(Aσ,−), ∀A ⊆ C. Let us prove that for all A, B ⊆ C, we have µ(A ∩ B) =
min(µ(A), µ(B)).
By assumption, µ(A ∩B) = µ((A ∩B)σ,−) with (A ∩B)σ,− = {σ(1), · · · , σ(k−)}. From Lemma 1, (A ∩B)σ,− ⊆
A ∩ B , but σ(k− + 1) /∈ A ∩ B . Hence, σ(k− + 1) /∈ A or σ(k− + 1) /∈ B . Suppose without loss of generality that 
σ(k− + 1) /∈ A. Then Aσ,− = (A ∩ B)σ,− hence µ(A ∩B) = µ(A) ≤ µ(B) so µ(A ∩ B) =min(µ(A), µ(B)). Con-
sequently µ is a necessity measure.
Conversely we consider a necessity measure N and the permutation σ such that πσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ πσ(n). Clearly,
N(A) = 1 − πσ(i0) with i0 =min{j : σ(j) /∈A}. So the set Aσ,− is {1, · · · , i0 − 1} and N(Aσ,−) = 1 − πi0 =N(A).
A similar proof can be developed for the case of possibility measures. Let σ be such that µ(A) = µ(Aσ,+). Let us 
prove that for all A, B ⊆ C, we have µ(A ∪B) =max(µ(A), µ(B)).
By assumption, µ(A ∪ B) = µ((A ∪ B)σ,+), where {σ(k+), . . . , σ(n))}. From Lemma 1, (A ∪ B)σ,+ ⊇ A ∪
B, ∀A ⊆ C. As A ∪ B 6⊂ {σ(k+ + 1), · · · , σ(n)}, then σ(k+) ∈ A or σ(k+) ∈ B . Suppose without loss of general-
ity that σ(k+) ∈ A. Then Aσ,+ = (A ∪ B)σ,+ hence µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) ≥ µ(B), so µ(A ∩ B) = max(µ(A), µ(B)). 
Consequently µ is a possibility measure.
Conversely we consider a possibility measure 5 and the permutation σ such that πσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ πσ(n). Then,
5(A) = πσ(i0) with i0 =min{j : σ(j) ∈A}. Aσ,+ is {i0, · · · , n} so 5(Aσ,+) = πi0 . ✷
Now we add suitable axioms to a known representation theorem for Choquet integral [41,4], and obtain a charac-
terisation theorem for the case when the capacity is a possibility or a necessity measure. When fi ≥ gi, ∀i ∈ C, we
write f ≥ g, for short.
Theorem 1. A function I : V →R satisfies the following properties:
C1 I (1, · · · , 1) = 1,
C2 Comonotonic additivity: I (f + g) = I (f ) + I (g) for f and g comonotonic,
C3 Pareto-dominance: f ≥ g implies I (f ) ≥ I (g),
54 Levelwise-optimism property: There exists a permutation σ on C such that ∀A, I (1A) = I (1Aσ,+),
if and only if I = C5, where 5(A) = I (1A) is a possibility measure.
Proof. It is easy to check that the Choquet integral with respect to 5 satisfies the properties C1-C3 and 54 according 
to the permutation associated with π . Conversely, if I satisfies the properties C1-C3, then according to the results 
presented in [41,4], I is a Choquet integral with respect to the fuzzy measure µ defined by µ(A) = I (1A). The
property 54 implies µ(A) = I (1σ,+A ) = µ(A
σ,+), and, using Lemma 2, this equality is equivalent to have a possibility
measure. ✷
Note that, in the previous theorem, Axiom 54 can be replaced by : There exists a permutation σ on C such that 
∀f , I (f ) = I (f σ,+).
We have a similar characterisation theorem for necessity measures:
Theorem 2. A function I : V →R satisfies the following properties:
C1 I (1, · · · , 1) = 1,
C2 Comonotonic additivity: I (f + g) = I (f ) + I (g) for f and g comonotonic,
C3 Pareto-dominance: f ≥ g implies I (f ) ≥ I (g),
N4 Level-pessimism property: There exists a permutation σ on C such that ∀A, I (1A) = I (1Aσ,−)
if and only if I = CN , where N(A) = I (1A) is a necessity measure.
Note that in the previous Theorem 2, Axiom N4 can be replaced by : There exists a permutation σ on C such that 
∀f , I (f ) = I (f σ,−).
Axioms 54 and N4 also make sense in decision under uncertainty, where the set C is a set of states of the world, 
and fi is the consequence of an act in state i. An optimistic decision maker is represented using a possibility measure
since under 54, the attractiveness of the profile in state i (f σ,+i ) is never less than the greatest value fj among the
states more plausible than i. Particularly, if the state i is the most plausible state and fi = 1, fj = 0, ∀j 6= i then
we have C5(f ) = C5(g), where gi = 1, ∀i ∈ C. The expected profit in a very plausible state is not affected by the
expected losses in less plausible states. The Choquet integral calculates the average of the best consequences for 
each plausibility level, hence the name “levelwise-optimism”. For a pessimistic decision maker, the attractiveness of 
the act in state i (f σ−i ) is never greater than the smallest value fj among the states that are more plausible than j .
Particularly, if the state i is the most plausible one, and fi = 0 while fj = 1, ∀j 6= i, then we have CN (f ) = CN (g),
with gi = 0, ∀i ∈ C. The expected profits in the least plausible states cannot compensate the expected losses in more
plausible states. In this case, the Choquet integral calculates the average of the worst consequences for each plausibility 
level.
The proposal of 54 and N4 as axioms can be questioned by pointing out their difficulty to be tested in practice, as 
there are n! possible ordering of elements in C. However, one may directly ask a decision-maker for the importance 
ordering between criteria (or the plausibility ordering of states), as this information is less demanding than, e.g., asking 
for genuine numerical weights. Then we can verify if the properties expressed by the axioms 54 and N4 correspond 
to the attitude of the decision-maker or not, through pairwise comparison of well-chosen profiles.
These results indicate that Choquet integrals w.r.t possibility and necessity measures are additive for a larger class 
of pairs of functions than usual, as first pointed out in [15], for instance CN(f + g) = CN (f ) + CN (g) as soon as
(f + g)σ,− = f σ,− + gσ,−, which does not imply that f and g are comonotonic.
Example 3. We consider C = {1, 2, 3}, the permutation associated with 5 such that π1 ≥ π2 ≥ π3 and the profiles
f = (1, 2, 3), g = (1, 3, 2) which are not comonotonic. We have f σ,− = (1, 1, 1), gσ,− = (1, 1, 1) and (f + g)σ,− =
(2, 2, 2) so (f + g)σ,− = f σ,− + gσ,−.
The above result should be analyzed in the light of a claim by Mesiar and Šipoš [34] stating that if the capacity µ is 
additive on the set of cuts {{i : fi ≥ α} : α > 0} ∪{{i : gi ≥ α} : α > 0} of f and g, then Cµ(f +g) = Cµ(f ) +Cµ(g).
For a general capacity, additivity holds only if f and g are comonotonic. For more particular capacities, the set of pairs 
of acts for which additivity holds on cuts can be larger. This is what seems to happen with possibility and necessity 
measures.
2.4. Possibilistic Choquet integrals: the infinite setting
In the context of decision under uncertainty (DMU), the set of criteria is replaced by a set S of more or less plausible 
states of affairs and profiles are called acts. Then, in the classical DMU framework, S is an infinite set, typically the 
real line or an interval of the real line; f is then a real function. Possibilistic uncertainty can be modelled by fuzzy 
intervals [10], that is, possibility distributions π on S such that {r : π(r) ≥ α} is a closed interval, ∀α ∈ (0, 1]. The 
pessimistic Choquet integral of a positive value function f is of the form [15]:
CN (f )=
+∞∫
0
N(f ≥ r)dr =
1∫
0
f π−(α)dα
Fig. 1. Continuous case.
where f π−(α) = inf{f (r) : π(r) ≥ α}. Likewise for the optimistic Choquet integral:
C5(f )=
+∞∫
0
5(f ≥ r)dr =
1∫
0
f π+(α)dα
where f π+(α) = sup{f (r) : π(r) ≥ α}. They are continuous counterparts of Equations (2) and (3) noticing that a 
possibility distribution can be viewed as a nested random set α ∈ [0; 1] 7→ {s : π(s) ≥ α} based on Lebesgue measure 
on [0, 1] [13].
If π is the membership function of a fuzzy interval M , under the random set interpretation, upper and lower mean 
values of M can be defined, i.e., E∗(M) and E∗(M), respectively, such that [13,29]:
E∗(M)=
1∫
0
infMλdλ; E∗(M)=
1∫
0
supMλdλ, (5)
where Mλ is the λ-cut of M . Note that these expressions are Choquet integrals of the identity function with respect
to the possibility and the necessity measures induced by M . The mean interval of a fuzzy interval M is defined as 
E(M) = [E∗(M), E
∗(M)]. It is thus the interval containing the mean values of all random variables compatible with
M (i.e., such that P(A) ≤5(A), ∀A measurable). Then it is clear that the following result holds:
Proposition 1. If f is a continuous function, CN (f ) = E∗(f (M)) and C5(f ) = E∗(f (M)), where f (M) is the
image of π by f via the extension principle: µf (M)(s) = sups:s=f (x) π(x).
Proof. It suffices to recall that the α cut of f (M) is precisely of the form [f π−(α), f π+(α)]. ✷
The notion of pessimistic and optimistic profiles can be generalised when C is changed into a continuous set 
S. A possibility distribution π on the set of possible states defines a complete plausibility ordering ≤π on S, and
given an act f , its pessimistic counterpart is f≤π ,−(s) = infs≤π s′ f (s′) and its optimistic counterpart is f≤π ,+(s) =
sups≤π s′ f (s
′).
Let us present an example of CN (f ) and C5(f ) when the set of the states of the world is represented with a real
interval (see Fig. 1).
Example 4. We consider C = [0, b], and let π(x) be the triangular fuzzy number with support [0, b] and core a < b. 
More precisely π(x) = x/a if 0 ≤ x ≤ a and b−x
b−a
otherwise. We consider the value function f (x) = (b− x)/b which 
is decreasing on [0, b].
If π(x) ≥ α, [aα, b − (b − a)α] is the associated α-cut, then the pessimistic value of the utility function on this 
interval is f π−(α) = f (b− (b− a)α) = (b−a)α
b
and the optimistic one is f π+(α) = f (aα) = 1 − aα
b
.
If b = 1 and a = 1/2 : CN (f ) =
∫ 1
0 f (b − (b − a)α)dα =
(b−a)
2b = 1/4; C5(f ) =
∫ 1
0 f (aα)dα = 1 −
a
2b = 3/4.
Finally, the pessimistic and optimistic substitutes of the value function f are (see Fig. 1):
f≤π ,−(x)=min(
(b− a)x
ab
,f (x)); f≤π ,+(x)=max(
(b− a)2 + a(x − a)
b(b− a)
, f (x)).
CN (f ) is also the expectation of f≤π ,− with respect to the uniform probability on [a, b] (pessimistic area), and
C5(f ) is the expectation of f≤π ,+ with respect to the uniform probability on [0, a] (optimistic area).
The use of fuzzy intervals for computing possibilistic Choquet integrals is of practical interest [24], and Example 4
can be extended to more general (non-linear) fuzzy intervals representing utility functions and possibility distributions. 
The difficulty lies in finding intersection points between membership functions, that could be facilitated by suitable 
parametrization of fuzzy intervals. The result in Proposition 1 may facilitate the computation of the possibilistic 
Choquet integrals, if it is easy to compute f (M) for the fuzzy interval M representing the uncertainty. For instance, in 
the example, the triangular possibility distribution π can be represented by the 3-tuple M = (0, a, b) that encodes the 
core and the support of π . Then it is obvious that f (M) = (0, 1 − a/b, 1) is triangular too, and CN (f ) is the midpoint
of the interval [0, 1 − a/b] while C5(f ) is the midpoint of the interval [1 − a/b, 1].
2.5. Preference relations between profiles
In axiomatic approaches to decision under uncertainty, the starting point is a preference relation between profiles 
that satisfies a number of prescribed axioms. Under some conditions, such a preference relation between profiles can 
be represented by Choquet integrals. There have been attempts to justify continuous Choquet integrals [9] by means 
of axioms bearing on the preference relation.
Let º be a preference relation on a set of infinite profiles V representing acts f : S→ [0, +∞), and given by the 
decision maker on such infinite profiles. In [7], the following axioms are proposed, in the infinite setting, i.e., the set 
of possible states is a dense (continuous) set of states S.
A1 Totality and Non-triviality: º is a non-trivial total preorder on V (transitive and complete, and a strict preference 
f ≻ g for at least two acts f, g).
A2 Continuity according to uniform monotone convergence:
A2.1 [fn, f, g ∈ V, fn º g, fn ↓u f ] ⇒ f º g;
A2.2 [fn, f, g ∈ V, g º fn, fn ↑u f ] ⇒ g º f ;
A3 Monotonicity: If f ≥ g+ ǫ, where ǫ is any positive constant function, then f ≻ g
A4 Comonotonic independence: Let f, g, h be profiles, where both f and h, and g and h are comonotonic; then 
f º g⇔ f + h º g+ h
We recall the following result [7]:
Theorem 3. A preference relation º satisfies axioms A1–A4 if and only if there exists a capacity µ such that Cµ
represents the preference relation. This capacity is unique.
Since only the ordering on states matters for possibilistic Choquet integrals, the levelwise-pessimism and levelwise-
optimism axioms can be expressed in terms of comparison between acts:
N4 There exists a complete preordering ºπ on S such that f ∼ fºπ ,−, where fºπ ,−(s) = infs′ºπ s f (s′).
54 There exists a complete preordering ºπ on S such that f ∼ fºπ ,+, where fºπ ,−(s) = sups′ºπ s f (s
′).
We can conjecture the following result in the pessimistic and optimistic cases: A preference relation º satisfies 
axioms A1–A4 and N4 (resp. 54) if and only if there exists a necessity (resp. possibility) measure N (resp. 5) such 
that CN (resp. C5) represents the preference relation. This necessity (resp. possibility) measure is unique.
The proof requires showing that the unique capacity obtained from axioms A1 −A4 is a necessity measure. How-
ever, a necessity measure must then satisfy the infinite minitivity axiom, N(∩i∈IAi) = infi∈I N(Ai), for any index
set I , in order to ensure the existence of a possibility distribution underlying the capacity. But it is not clear how to 
extend Lemma 2 to infinite families of sets. As its stands, Lemma 2 only justifies finite minitivity. In a finite setting, 
the permutation σ , indicating the relative plausibility of states can be extracted from the preference relation on pro-
files, by observing special ones. The possibility ordering ºπ underlying the preference relation º can be extracted by
considering binary profiles of the form fs such that fs(s) = 0 and fs(t) = 1 if t 6= s More precisely, s ºπ t when-
ever fs º ft . In the infinite setting, it may be that º is non-trivial while s ∼π t for all s, t ∈ S. For instance, on a
denumerable set, such as the positive integers, assigning necessity degree 1 to all complements of finite subsets and 0 
otherwise yields a finitely minitive set function that corresponds to assigning zero possibility degrees to all integers.
The same difficulty arises for the optimistic counterpart of the above tentative result. This is left for further research.
3. Preference-based axiomatisations of Sugeno integral: a review with new results
In this section, we stick to a qualitative setting using a finite value scale. To distinguish from the numerical case, we
denote by ∧ and ∨ the minimum and the maximum on L. The Sugeno integral [42,43] of a profile f can be defined 
by means of several expressions, among which the two following normal forms [32]1:
−
∫
f ◦µ=
∨
A⊆C
µ(A)∧∧i∈Afi =
∧
A⊆C
(1−µc(A))∨∨i∈Afi (6)
A first statement of this equality was proved quite early by Kandel and Byatt [30] in 1978. The aim of this section 
is first to show that the new axioms for possibilistic Choquet integrals can be also used to characterize possibilistic 
Sugeno integrals. Moreover we review the existing axiomatizations of Sugeno integrals in the style of Savage, based 
on preference relations between acts expressing the choices of a decision-maker. In the axiomatization proposed in 
[21,22], the proof of the representation theorem turns out to be too sketchy. A careful analysis shows that some gaps 
remain. The aim of this section is also to fix these defects, and propose an alternative axiomatic framework based on a 
non-compensation axiom, all of which, augmented with the preference-based version of the levelwise pessimism and 
optimism axioms, provide a new preference-based justification of possibility theory.
3.1. A new characterisation of possibilistic Sugeno integrals
Sugeno integral can be characterized as follows [38,27]:
Theorem 4. Let I : LC → L. There is a capacity µ such that I (f ) = −
∫
f ◦µ for every f ∈ LC if and only if the 
following properties are satisfied
1. I (f ∨ g) = I (f ) ∨ I (g), for any comonotonic f, g ∈ LC .
2. I (a ∧ f ) = a ∧ I (f ), for every a ∈ L and f ∈ LC .
3. I (1C) = 1.
Equivalently, conditions (1–3) can be replaced by conditions (1’–3’) below:
1’. I (f ∧ g) = I (f ) ∧ I (g), for any comonotonic f, g ∈ LC .
2’. I (a ∨ f ) = a ∨ I (f ), for every a ∈ L and f ∈LC .
3’. I (0C) = 0.
Most older formulations of this theorem [4,36] add an assumption of increasing monotonicity of the functional I
(if f ≥ g then I (f ) ≥ I (g)) to the three conditions (1–3). But these papers do not point out the equivalent condi-
tions (1’–3’). The existence of these two equivalent characterisations is due to the possibility of equivalently writing 
Sugeno integral in conjunctive and disjunctive form – Eq. (6), so that −
∫
f ◦ µ = 1 − −
∫
(1 − f ) ◦ µc (an equality 
proved in [28]) and the fact that a functional I (f ) satisfies conditions (1–3) if and only if 1 − I (1 −f ) satisfies condi-
tions (1’–3’). Marichal [32] provides several similar characterizations, especially one assuming maxitive and minitive 
comonotonicity (conditions 1 and 1’) along with idempotence, one assuming homogeneity conditions 2 and 2’ plus 
1 We use Sugeno’s original notation, so as to distinguish from the usual integral.
increasing monotonicity. However, the proof that conditions (1–3) are necessary and sufficient seems to first appear 
only in the thesis [38] (and then used in [27,25]). We put a short version of it in Appendix A for the sake of complete-
ness. This proof shows that we only need to request conditions 2 and 2’ for characteristic functions of sets (f = 1A),
as done in [25], p. 244.
Moreover, for a necessity measure N , −
∫
f ◦N =∧ni=1(1 − πi) ∨ fi (weighted min); and for a possibility measure
5, −
∫
f◦5 =∨ni=1πi∧fi (weighted max); see for instance [12] pp. 138–139, for the latter and [28] for the former. The
Sugeno integral with respect to a possibility (resp. necessity) measure is maxitive (resp. minitive), hence the following 
characterization results for them:
Theorem 5. Let I : LC →L. There is a possibility measure 5 such that I (f ) =−
∫
f ◦5 for every f ∈ LC if and only 
if the following properties are satisfied
1. I (f ∨ g) = I (f ) ∨ I (g), for any f, g ∈ LC .
2. I (a ∧ f ) = a ∧ I (f ), for every a ∈L and f ∈ LC .
3. I (1C) = 1.
Theorem 6. There is a necessity measure N such that I (f ) =−
∫
f ◦N for every f ∈ LC if and only if the following 
properties are satisfied
1’. I (f ∧ g) = I (f ) ∧ I (g), for any f, g ∈ LC .
2’. I (a ∨ f ) = a ∨ I (f ), for every a ∈L and f ∈ LC .
3’. I (0C) = 0.
This is easy to check as the comonotonic maxitivity (resp. minitivity) of I enforces the maxitivity (resp. minitivity) 
of the underlying capacity. However, we can alternatively characterise those simplified Sugeno integrals in the same 
style as we did for possibilistic Choquet integrals, using optimistic and pessimistic substitutes, due to the following
Lemma 3. −
∫
f ◦N =−
∫
f σ,−◦N, −
∫
f ◦5 =−
∫
f σ,+◦5.
Proof. Assume π1 ≥ · · · ≥ πn for simplicity, i.e., σ(i) = i. By definition f σ,− ≤ f so −
∫
f σ,−◦N ≤−
∫
f ◦N since the 
Sugeno integral is an increasing function. Let i0 and i1 be the indices such that −
∫
f σ,−◦N = (1 − πi0) ∨∧j≤i0fi0) =
(1 − πi0) ∨ fi1 where i1 ≤ i0. Hence πi1 ≥ πi0 , i.e., 1 − πi1 ≤ 1 − πi0 and −
∫
f σ,−◦N ≥ (1 − πi1) ∨ fi1 ≥−
∫
f ◦N .
By definition f ≤ f σ,+ so −
∫
f ◦5 ≤−
∫
f+◦5. Let i0 and i1 be the indices such that −
∫
f σ,+◦5 = πi0 ∧∨j≤i0fj =
πi0 ∧ fi1 where i1 ≤ i0. Hence πi0 ≤ πi1 and −
∫
f σ,+◦5 ≤ πi1 ∧ fi1 ≤−
∫
f ◦5. ✷
In particular, using notations of Subsection 2.2, −
∫
f ◦N =−
∫
φk ◦N , −
∫
f ◦5 =−
∫
φk◦5, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, as for 
Choquet integral.
Now we can state qualitative counterparts of Theorems 1 and 2, that are proved in the same way:
Theorem 7. There is a possibility measure 5 such that I (f ) =−
∫
f ◦5 for every f ∈ LC if and only if the following 
properties are satisfied
1. I (f ∨ g) = I (f ) ∨ I (g), for any comonotonic f, g ∈ LC .
2. I (a ∧ f ) = a ∧ I (f ), for every a ∈ L and f ∈ LC .
3. I (1C) = 1.
54 There exists a permutation σ on C such that ∀A, I (1A) = I (1Aσ,+)
Theorem 8. There is a necessity measure N such that I (f ) =−
∫
f ◦N for every f ∈ LC if and only if the following 
properties are satisfied
1. I (f ∧ g) = I (f ) ∧ I (g), for any comonotonic f, g ∈ LC .
2. I (a ∨ f ) = a ∨ I (f ), for every a ∈ L and f ∈ LC .
3. I (0C) = 1.
N4 There exists a permutation σ on C such that ∀A, I (1A) = I (1Aσ,−)
Axiom 54 (resp., N4) can be replaced by: there exists a permutation σ on C such that for all f , I (f ) = I (f σ,+)
(resp. I (f ) = I (f σ,−)).
Remark 1. The same weakened condition I (a ∧ 1A) = a ∧ 1A as in [25] (Theorem 4.58, p. 244), could be used in 
place of the second assumption in the above Theorems 5, 7, and I (a ∨ f ) = a ∨ I (f ) in Theorems 6, 8.
These results make it clear that the levelwise-pessimism and optimism axioms are generic assumptions in the sense 
that they apply equally to Sugeno and Choquet discrete integrals. In the case of Sugeno integral, for the MCDM 
context, there are two equivalent axiomatisations of the possibility-based and necessity-based versions, because we 
can take advantage of the respective maxitivity and minitivity properties of weighted max and min, that carry over to 
non-Boolean profiles, while this is impossible in the case of Choquet integral. The levelwise-pessimism and optimism 
axioms are properties that enforce the possibilistic setting regardless of the considered characterisation of the integral.
3.2. Act-based axiomatisation of Sugeno integral
In this section, the set of criteria is replaced by a finite set S of states and acts are just functions f from S to a 
set of consequences X. We consider again a finite totally ordered scale (L, ≤) with bottom 0 and top 1. A mapping 
u : X→ L is named a utility function. We assume that X contains an ideal consequence x∗ with u(x∗) = 1 and a
worst consequence x∗ with u(x∗) = 0.
The decision-maker is supposed to supply a preference relation º on the set XS of acts, that is, a non-trivial
preorder: º is transitive and complete.
We introduce new notations that will be useful in the following:
• A constant act x is such that ∃x ∈ X, ∀s ∈ S, x(s) = x. In particular, the acts x∗ and x∗ are such that x∗(s) =
x∗, ∀s ∈ S and x∗(s) = x∗, ∀s ∈ S.
• Given x, y ∈X, a binary act f = xAy is an act such that f (s) = x if s ∈A and f (s) = y if s ∈A.
• For acts f, g, fAg is the act defined by fAg(s) = f (s) for all s in A and fAg(s) = g(s) for all s in A.
Note that the preference relation º induces a complete preordering ≥P on consequences : x ≥P y if and only
if x º y; this ordering can be extended to acts as follows: f ≥P g if and only if f (s) ≥P g(s), ∀s ∈ S. This is the
Pareto-ordering. Then, one can define an act f ∨ g making the best of f and g, such that ∀s ∈ S, f ∨ g(s) = f (s) if 
f (s) ≥P g(s) and g(s) otherwise; and an act f ∧ g making the worst of f and g, such that ∀s ∈ S, f ∧ g(s) = f (s)
if g(s) ≥P f (s) and g(s) otherwise. Acts are thus combined like fuzzy sets.
The axioms proposed in [21] are as follows:
A1 Totality: º is a non-trivial total preorder, i.e., it is transitive and complete, and f ≻ g for some acts.
WP3 Weak compatibility with constant acts: ∀A ⊆ S, ∀x, y ∈X, ∀f, x ≥ y implies xAf º yAf .
RCD Restricted conjunctive dominance: For any acts g, h and any constant act x, x ≻ h and g ≻ h imply x ∧ g ≻ h.
Upper-bounding the utility of an act g better than another act h by a constant value that is better than the utility 
of act h still yields an act better than h.
RDD Restricted max-dominance: For any acts g, h and any constant act x, h ≻ x and h ≻ g imply h ≻ x ∨ g.
If an act h is preferred to an act g and also to the constant act x then if the bad consequences of g are upgraded to 
x, h is still preferred to g.
Note that axioms A1 and WP3 entail Pareto-dominance: if f ≥p g then f º g (see Lemma 4 in [22]). Moreover,
RCD and RDD make sense for one-shot decisions, i.e., without repetition, making the compensation of bad results 
by good ones impossible.
We recall here the main result about this axiomatization for decision under uncertainty.
Theorem 9 ([21]). Let (XS , º) be a preference structure. The following propositions are equivalent:
• (XS , º) satisfies A1, plus WP3, RCD, RDD.
• There exists a finite chain L of preference levels, an L-valued monotonic set-function µ, and an L-valued utility
function u on X, such that f º g if and only if −
∫
u(f ) ◦µ ≥−
∫
u(g) ◦µ.
This result is the counterpart, using preference between acts, of Theorem 4.2 in [32]. However the existing proof 
of this result as given in [21], and stated again in [22], is incomplete. It develops in 4 steps recalled here:
Step 1: The scale Since the preference relation º is complete (A1), the finite qualitative scale L is the set of acts 
quotiented by the associated indifference relation ∼. We evaluate f by I (f ) ∈ L, the element in L associated 
to the equivalence class of f . The utility function u is constructed on X by restricting ¹ to constant acts 
(equivalence classes of ≥P ), namely u(x) = I (x).
Step 2: The capacity We define a set function µ by means of extreme binary acts as µ(A) = I (x∗Ax∗). If A ⊆
B , then x∗Ax∗ ≤P x∗Bx∗ i.e. µ(B) ≥ µ(A) from Pareto-dominance. In particular, we have µ(S) = I (x∗) =
I (x∗, · · · , x∗) = 1, µ(∅) = I (x∗) = I (x∗, · · · , x∗) = 0. So µ is a fuzzy measure.
Step 3: The internal operator We extend the functional I to binary acts of the form xAx∗. By Pareto-dominance,
since xAx∗ ≤P x∗Ax∗ and xAx∗ ≤P x, it follows that xAx∗ ¹ x∗Ax∗ and xAx∗ ¹ x. So we have I (xAx∗) ≤
I (x∗Ax∗) = µ(A) and I (xAx∗) ≤ I (x) = u(x) hence I (xAx∗) ≤ µ(A) ∧ u(x).
Note that xAx∗ = x ∧ (x∗Ax∗). The contrapositive form of RCD implies x∗Ax∗ ¹ xAx∗ or x ¹ xAx∗. So either
I (xAx∗) ≥ µ(A) or I (xAx∗) ≥ u(x). We conclude that I (xAx∗) = µ(A) ∧ u(x).
Step 4: The external operator In [21] it is claimed that for any two xAx∗ and yBx∗, where B ⊆ A, axiom RDD
implies I ((xAx∗) ∨ (yBx∗)) = I (xAx∗) ∨ I (yBx∗). Finally, let x∗ = xm > · · · > x1 = x∗, that is, m = #X.
Any act f can be expressed as ∨mi=1xiFix∗, where Fi = {s : f (s) ≥P xi}, and m = #X is the number of
consequences, so that I (f ) =∨mi=1I (xiFix∗) =∨
m
i=1(µ(Fi) ∧ u(xi)).
However in Step 4, it is clear that we cannot directly apply axiom RDD to acts xAx∗, yBx∗ and their disjunction,
like it is done in Step 3 for conjunction and RDD. This is because to apply axiom RDD, one of the acts must be 
constant. We could directly get the result of Step 4 if we replace RDD by a comonotonicity axiom, namely [6]:
CDD: if g and h are comonotonic, then f ≻ g and f ≻ h imply f ≻ g ∨ h.
Then, since ∨ji=1xiFix∗ and xj+1Fj+1x∗ are comonotonic, CDD and Pareto-dominance imply I (∨
j+1
i=1 xiFix∗) =
I (∨
j
i=1xiFix∗) ∨ I (xj+1Fj+1x∗), and I (f ) =∨
m
i=1I (xiFix∗) follows by induction.
In Appendix B, we propose a new version of Step 4 of the proof, showing that axiom RDD is indeed enough to get 
the representation theorem at this point. In the next section we provide an alternative proof of Theorem 9 based on the 
idea of non-compensation.
3.3. A non-compensation axiom
Sugeno integral is non-compensatory by nature: it returns a result that is always in the set consisting of the u(fi)’s
and the values µ(A).
This is natural for one-shot decisions. For instance, if it is only known that s ∈ E ⊆ S then the actual utility of an 
act is the utility of the (only) outcome, that is, it should be a value in {u(x), x ∈E}. For instance, flipping a coin once, 
suppose A stands for head and x means that you get 100 euros. Its complement A stands for tail and y means that you 
lose 100 euros. Then, the worth of this lottery xAy is either u(100) (if you think you win), u(−100) if you think you 
lose, or it reflects your confidence in A, which in case of ignorance is evaluated as 0 (pessimistic case) or 1 (optimistic 
case).
This remark leads to a simpler axiomatization based on this non-compensation property:
Axiom NC : 


x∗Ay∼ y or x∗Ay∼ x∗Ax∗ (DNC)
and
xAx∗ ∼ x or xAx∗ ∼ x
∗Ax∗ (CNC)
For a binary act, this axiom reflects the fact that −
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ equals either u(x), u(y), or the likelihood of A, 
µ(A), which is u(x∗Ax∗), or the likelihood of A, µ(A).
Axiom NC also reflects the fact that Sugeno integral is decomposable in terms of medians [33]. In particular, 
−
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ =median(u(x), u(y), µ(A)), if x >P y. Axiom NC indeed accounts for the following features:
• If u(x) > u(y) and µ(A) is too small (µ(A) ≤ u(y)), then we get −
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ = u(y);
• If u(x) > u(y) and µ(A) is high enough (µ(A) ≥ u(x)), then we get −
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ = u(x);
• u(x) ≥−
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ ≥ u(y) (no way of expecting results better than x or worse than y);
• if u(x) = 1 then −
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ =−
∫
u(x∗Ay) ◦µ ≥ µ(A) ∨ u(y), and in fact, −
∫
u(x∗Ay) ◦µ = µ(A) ∨ u(y);
• if u(y) = 0 then −
∫
u(xAy) ◦µ =−
∫
u(xAx∗) ◦µ ≤ µ(A) ∧ u(x), and in fact, −
∫
u(xAx∗) ◦µ = µ(A) ∧ u(x).
Then we can prove the following result (original, to the best of our knowledge):
Theorem 10. Theorem 9 still holds if RCD and RDD are replaced by the non-compensation axiom NC.
Proof. Like before, the utility scale L is the set of acts quotiented by the indifference relation ∼, and I (f ) denotes 
the equivalence class of f . Again construct the ordinal utility function u on X, by restricting º which is complete, 
to constant acts. We again derive the capacity µ as µ(A) = I (x∗Ax∗) and assume x1 = x∗ > x2 > · · ·> xm = x∗. For
any act f , and any consequence xi , let again Fi = {s : f (s) ºP xi}. Consider acts x∗Fi+1xi and xiFix∗.
• x∗Fi+1xi º f º xiFix∗ (Pareto-dominance);
• by DNC, I (x∗Fi+1xi) ∈ {µ(Fi+1), u(xi)}, hence I (f ) ≤ I (x∗Fi+1xi) ≤ µ(Fi+1) ∨ u(xi);
• by CNC, I (xiFix∗) ∈ {µ(Fi), u(xi)}, hence I (f ) ≥ I (xiFix∗) ≥ µ(Fi) ∧ u(xi).
Then for all states xi , µ(Fi+1) ∨ u(xi) ≥ I (f ) ≥ µ(Fi) ∧ u(xi).
Hence, ∧mi=1µ(Fi+1) ∨ u(xi) ≥ I (f ) ≥∨
m
i=1µ(Fi) ∧ u(xi).
But the two bounds are equal and are Sugeno integral. ✷
The reader may have noticed that in fact axioms RCD and RDD are completely related to the NC axiom since:
Proposition 2. Under the Pareto dominance property, RCD implies CNC and RDD implies DNC.
Proof. RCD implies CNC is established in [21,22] at Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 9, as recalled above. Now let 
us prove that Axiom RDD and Pareto Dominance imply ∀A ⊆ S, ∀x, x∗Ax ∼ x or x∗Ax ∼ x∗Ax∗.
Pareto Dominance implies x∗Ax º x and x∗Ax º x∗Ax∗.
We decompose x∗Ax as (x∗Ax∗) ∨ x and apply axiom RDD. Since x∗Ax ∼ (x∗Ax∗) ∨ x we conclude x∗Ax ¹ x or
x∗Ax ¹ x∗Ax∗. Hence x∗Ax ∼ x or x∗Ax ∼ x∗Ax∗ ✷
So proving Theorem 10 is a simpler way to prove the representation Theorem 9, avoiding Step 4 of the proof 
proposed by Dubois et al. [21].
3.4. A new characterisation for qualitative possibilistic integrals
In the case of a Sugeno integral with respect to a possibility measure, RDD is replaced by the stronger axiom of 
disjunctive dominance:
Axiom DD (disjunctive dominance) : ∀f, g, h, h ≻ f and h ≻ g imply h ≻ f ∨ g.
And we get a similar result as the above Theorem 9, whereby f º g if and only if −
∫
u(f ) ◦5 ≥−
∫
u(g) ◦5 for a 
possibility measure 5 [23].
In the case of a Sugeno integral with respect to a necessity measure, RCD is replaced by the stronger axiom of 
conjunctive dominance:
Axiom CD (conjunctive dominance) : ∀f, g, h, f ≻ h and g ≻ h imply f ∧ g ≻ h.
And we get a similar result as the above Theorem 9, whereby f º g if and only if −
∫
u(f ) ◦µ ≥ −
∫
u(g) ◦µ for a 
necessity measure 5 [23].
We can then replace axioms DD and CD in these representation results by the levelwise-optimism and levelwise-
pessimism axioms, proposed in this paper, expressed in terms of preference equivalence between binary acts. We just 
add them to the characteristic axioms for Sugeno integrals in terms of a preference relation between acts
Theorem 11. Let (XS , º) be a preference structure. The following propositions are equivalent:
• (XS , º) satisfies A1, plus WP3, RCD, RDD and 54’
• There exists a permutation σ on S such that for all A ⊆ S, x∗Ax∗ ∼ (x∗Ax∗)σ,+.
• There exists a finite chain of preference levels L, an L-valued monotonic possibility measure 5, and an L-valued
utility function u on X, such that f º g if and only if −
∫
u(f ) ◦5 ≥−
∫
u(g) ◦5.
Theorem 12. Let (XS , º) be a preference structure. The following propositions are equivalent:
• (XS , º) satisfies A1, plus WP3, RCD, RDD and N4’
• There exists a permutation σ on S such that for all A ⊆ S, x∗Ax∗ ∼ (x∗Ax∗)σ,−.
• There exists a finite chain of preference levels L, an L-valued necessity measure N , and an L-valued utility
function u on X, such that f º g if and only if −
∫
u(f ) ◦N ≥−
∫
u(g) ◦N .
The reason for the validity of those theorems in the case of Sugeno integral is exactly the same as the reason for 
the validity of Theorems 1, 2, 7, 8: adding 54 (resp. N4) to the representation theorem of Sugeno integral forces the 
capacity to be a possibility (resp. necessity) measure. Note that in 54’ above, we have that (x∗Ax∗)σ,+ = x∗Aσ,+x∗
and in N4’ above, (x∗Ax∗)σ,− = x∗Aσ,−x∗, so that the above results follow from Lemma 1.
This axiomatisation of possibilistic integrals in the qualitative setting is one among other possible ones as seen in 
this section. However, the level optimism and pessimism axioms seem to be unavoidable to axiomatize possibilistic 
Choquet integrals as they are no longer maxitive nor minitive functionals. It is interesting to notice that the same 
axioms are instrumental to specialize Sugeno and Choquet integrals to possibility and necessity measures. In the case 
of qualitative possibilistic integrals, the maxitivity or minitivity property of the preference functional makes it possible 
to propose more choices of axioms.
4. Conclusion
This paper proposes an original axiomatization of discrete Choquet integrals with respect to possibility and ne-
cessity measures, and shows that it is enough to add, to existing axiomatisations of general instances of Choquet 
integrals, a property of indifference between some profiles or acts, that singles out possibility or necessity measures. 
Remarkably, this property, which says that the decision-maker only considers relevant the relative importance of sin-
gle criteria, is qualitative in nature and can thus be added as well to axiom systems for Sugeno integrals, to yield 
qualitative weighted min and max aggregation operations. It can be expressed as well in the ordinal act-based prefer-
ence setting à la Savage. We conjecture that results on the qualitative side go beyond Sugeno integrals and apply to 
more general qualitative functionals, replacing the inner minimum and maximum connectives by more general con-
junctions and disjunctions or implications (t-norms and conorms [5], semi-copulas [2], residuated implications and 
their semi-duals [18], more generally non-commutative conjunctions and their semi-duals [19,20]). This is a matter of 
further research.
Possibilistic Choquet integrals are the simplest ones (apart from the standard integral), and are instrumental in 
representing a numerical capacity in terms of several convex sets of probabilities, each generating upper and lower 
probabilities that are possibility and necessity measures as studied by Brüning and Denneberg [3]. These authors ob-
serve that any numerical capacity is an upper necessity measure, each corresponding to a convex set of probabilities. 
This property seems to carry over to Choquet integrals; this is the so-called maximin representation of capacities. In-
terestingly similar findings exist for qualitative capacities and Sugeno integral [17]. This additional similarity between 
qualitative and numerical possibilistic integrals confirms the important role of possibility theory in the mathematics 
of uncertainty modeling.
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Appendix A. Characterization of Sugeno integral without monotonicity assumption [38]
The fact that Sugeno integral verifies conditions (1–3) of Theorem 4 is obvious. Now, for the sufficiency. Rico [38]
proceeds in 3 steps (conditions 1, 2, 3 refer to those in the theorem).
1. A profile f can be written as ∨mi=1λi ∧ 1Fi with Fi = {j : fj ≥ λi} and λi ∈L. Profiles λi ∧ 1Fi are comonotonic,
and take value λi on Fi and 0 otherwise. By condition 1, I (f ) =∨mi=1I (λi ∧ 1Fi ). By condition 2, I (λi ∧ 1Fi ) =
λi ∧ I (1Fi ).
2. The set-function defined by µ(A) = I (1A) is a capacity. Indeed, condition 2 implies that I (a ∧ 1A) = a ∧ I (1A),
so that I (1∅) = I (0 ∧ 1A) = 0. Condition 3 means I (1C) = 1. Now consider A ⊆B . 1A and 1B are comonotonic
and 1A ∨ 1B = 1B . Condition 1 implies I (1A ∨ 1B) = I (1B) = I (1A) ∨ I (1B). So I (1B) ≤ I (1A).
So I (f ) =∨mi=1λi ∧µ(Fi), which the original form of Sugeno integral [42,43].
Appendix B. A new proof for Step 4 of Theorem 9
This is inspired by the proof published in Sabbadin’s Ph.D thesis [39], written in French, which however contains 
a small mistake as well. Let x∗ = xm > · · ·> x1 = x∗ and act f is expressed as ∨ni=1xiFix∗ as in Step 4 of Theorem 9.
Proposition 3. I (f ) =∨mi=1I (xiFix∗).
Proof. Clearly f º xiFix∗, ∀i = 1, . . . , m by Pareto-dominance. So I (f ) ≥ ∨mi=1I (xiFix∗). Now we need two lem-
mas:
Lemma 4. f ¹ xi and f ¹ fFix∗ imply f ∼ xiFix∗.
Proof. Assume f ¹ xi and f ¹ fFix∗. By Pareto-Dominance, fFix∗ ¹ x∗Fix∗. So we have f ¹ xi and f ¹ x∗Fix∗.
But using Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 9, we know, by RCD and Pareto-dominance, that xi∧(x∗Fix∗) = xiFix∗ ∼ xi
or ∼ x∗Fix∗. So f ¹ xiFix∗, but due to Pareto-dominance, f ∼ xiFix∗. ✷
Lemma 5. f ¹ xi implies either f ¹ fFix∗ or f ¹ xi−1.
Proof. Assume f ¹ xi , f ≻ fFix∗ and f ≻ xi−1. Hence f ≻ fFixi−1 by RDD, which is in contradiction with
Pareto-Dominance, as f ≤P fFixi−1. ✷
More precisely, since f ≥P fFix∗, the conclusion of Lemma 5 reads: either f ∼ fFix∗ or f ¹ xi−1. If x∗ ≺ f ¹
x∗, there is an index i such that xi−1 ≺ f ¹ xi , so f ∼ fFix∗, that is I (f ) = I (f Fix∗) > u(xi−1) and using the claim
in Lemma 4 (via RCD), we conclude that ∃i : f ∼ xiFix∗. So ∃i : I (f ) = I (xiFix∗). Hence I (f ) ≤ ∨mi=1I (xiFix∗)
which together with I (f ) ≥∨mi=1I (xiFix∗) yields I (f ) =∨
m
i=1I (xiFix∗). In case f ∼ x∗, then as ∀i > 1, f º xiFix∗
by Pareto-dominance, it implies that ∀i > 1, xiFix∗ ∼ x∗ as well, hence I (xiFix∗) = 0 and I (f ) = ∨mi=1I (xiFix∗)
trivially. ✷
Now using Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 9 along with Proposition 3 that replaces Step 4, it yields I (f ) =
∨mi=1(µ(Fi) ∧ u(xi)).
Remark. In his Ph.D. dissertation [39], Sabbadin claims to prove that f ¹ xi implies either f ¹ xiFix∗ or f ¹ xi−1
directly. To prove it, Sabbadin assumes f ¹ xi , f ≻ fFix∗ and f ≻ xi−1. But the right assumption should include
f ≻ xiFix∗ in place of f ≻ fFix∗. And then we cannot directly conclude that f ¹ xiFix∗ or f ¹ xi−1; indeed
f ≻ fFix∗ and f ≻ xi−1 just implies f ≻ fFixi−1 via RDD, which is not in contradiction with f ¹ xi . The above
proof provides a correction to what seems to have been an oversight.
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